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Abstract This annual report describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-
based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform
and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and
safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for
visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate
possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and
anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate
scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in
model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components
and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from
Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text
processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also
aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these
models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and
completeness.
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Problem Statement
Unsafe system-software interactions are a major concern in software validation and in demonstrating
software safety.' A unified, systematic, and automated approach is needed to validate system
requirements and identify failures and hazards that NASA flight software is designed to handle. Early
evaluation of software requirements and design will reduce system-software integration risks. It is
important to identify requirements gaps and robustness issues early and often because relevant
factors in complex controlled systems are easily overlooked. It is also important to assess system
failures and anomalous conditions that may challenge software in system integration testing. As
shown in Figure 1, operations and stresses in software can "activate" faults and influence failures in
the controlled system (the "plant") or the environment. Likewise, operations and stresses in the
controlled system or the environment can "activate" faults and influence failures in the software.
Interacting cascades are possible.
Uniform automated methods are needed for extracting early information from requirements
specifications, for system modeling, requirements validation, and safety analysis. Without these
methods, quality is inconsistent from one project to the next. Probability increases that requirements-
induced errors and hazards will propagate to subsequent development phases. In addition, excessive
amounts of time can be consumed in reanalyzing modified or added requirements as projects
progress. Semi-automated information extraction, model generation, and analysis can save labor and
schedule by using data extracted from documents. Automated information extraction can improve the
efficiency, consistency, repeatability, and comprehensiveness of modeling and analysis, and it can
reduce the time spent reanalyzing when specifications and designs change.
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Figure 1: Concept of system-software interactions related to hazards.
Technical Approach
The goal of the research is to enable early model-based system-software failure and hazard analysis
during requirements and design phases. The approach is to integrate and enhance previously
developed prototype tools for text information extraction, system architecture modeling, simulation,
23and analysis. The feasibility of this integrated approach has been demonstrated. Figure 2 shows a
diagram of the relationships among the prototypes in the project. This diagram is taken from the
Concept of Operations document for the project, 4 which provides a functional description of the
proposed system and its components and defines operational scenarios for tasks supported by the
system. Products of the system support safety and mission assurance (SMA) analysts.
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Figure 2: Component diagram of model-based system-software safety analysis.
Reconcilers and the Aerospace Ontology6 are used together for semantic analysis and extraction of
models from requirements and design texts. Parts of abstract physical architecture models are
extracted to model and analyze the controlled system architecture. Systems, subsystems and
components and their interfaces are extracted. Operational modes and functions, constraints,
sensitivities, hazards, and risks will also be extracted.
The Hazard Identification Tool (HIT) Modeler module is used to semi-automatically develop system
architecture models from the extracted model information by using model structures that map to the
types of extracted information. This module uses the Aerospace Ontology to screen sentence
interpretations for the types of extracted entities and weed out spurious mappings to model structures.
Libraries of component types can fill in missing information with defaults. HIT Modeler also provides a
visualization for inspecting the architecture implied by the requirements and design documents.
The HIT Path Analyzer module ? and the CONFIG hybrid simulator$ are used to analyze hazard paths
and simulate risk propagation in the system during operational and off-nominal scenarios. CONFIG
has been used previously for validation testing of intelligent control software for gas storage and
transfer in a manned life support test. Among other things, deficiencies in the software requirements
were identified. Analysis and simulation is used to identify possible hazard paths in test scenarios for
a virtual system integration laboratory (VSIL) for software testing.9
Technical Challenges
Documents containing requirements, design, hazard analysis, and Failure Modes and Effects
analyses (FMEAs) have proven to be incomplete and preliminary in the period prior to the project
Preliminary Design Review. Needed model information can be missing, and model information can be
redundant or internally inconsistent within a single document. This makes it difficult to perform
simulation or path analysis without significant human intervention. On the other hand, model
visualizations can help analysts reconcile and complete architectural models of the controlled system.
These visualizations can also help analysts find discrepancies and inconsistencies in requirements
and safety analyses.
Goals and Progress
Summary
There has been significant technical progress in model extraction from Orion program text sources,
architecture model derivation (components and connections) and documentation of extraction
sources. Models have been derived from Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and
FMEA documents. Linguistic text processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the
Aerospace Ontology also aids automated model development from the extracted information.
Visualizations of these models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency
and completeness. Types of interface components (e.g., Remote Interface Unit [RIU]), types of
carriers and types of distributors (e.g., manifold) are represented in the model and the visualization.
For example: A carries energy to B; A provides power to B; C receives command data from B; A
distributes energy to Bs and Cs.
Some work has been done on simulation and path analysis that uses the extracted models, but the
bulk of that work will be done next year. This work is dependent on extraction of functions and failures
from FMEA documents. Extraction of these types of information is in progress.
Advice and feedback from Flight Software Engineering and Orion Software Safety and Mission
Assurance have successfully guided the project work.
NASA Orion Launch Abort System Case
A NASA expert on Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) software helped identify LAS document parts
and formats that would be the best sources of the modeling information. This led to a focus on IIRDs
and Preliminary FMEAs. These were both available and had the type of architecture and scenario
information that is needed for modeling. The expert suggested that the best candidates were the
inertial sensors or the paths and interactions for firing pyrotechnic separation mechanisms during the
Pad Abort sequence. Figure 3 shows a notional Pad Abort Sequence for Orion. No direct command
feedback was expected in the design. The Crew Module (CM) software and computers connect to the
Pyrotechnic Event Controllers (PECs) in the RIU, which connect to the LAS Pyrotechnics, The PECs
control ignition of the LAS motors, including the Abort Motor (AM), Jettison Motor (JM) and Abort
Control Motor (ACM). The RIU also contains PEC Control Output and PEC Power Supply Shield
modules. Figure 4 shows the LAS pyrotechnics, which includes PECs, NASA Standard Initiators
(NSI), and the NASA Standard Detonators (NSD) that are ignited by currents controlled by the RIU
PEC outputs. Three commands are required to ignite a NSI: ARM; Fire-1; and Fire-2.
This year, the project has focused on modeling and developing visualizations of the pyrotechnics
architecture. Primary extraction sources have been the Orion and Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)
FMEAs, including the CEV-S-009 Avionics FMEA, as well as the CEV-T-035101, the CEV IIRD. The
IIRD describes required interfaces between the three modules within the CEV elements: the Service
Module (SM); the CM; and the LAS.
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Figure 3: CEV Pad Abort Sequence - notional.
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Figure 4: LAS Ordnance Subsystem Schematic.
4
Model Information Extraction
Model information extraction is accomplished by converting documents to structured text and
extracting model parts from selected relevant sections. The software that performs linguistic
processing of relevant sentences has been named the Semantic Text Analysis Tool (STAT). STAT
output in xml format shows part-of and connection relationships among model components. A detailed
procedure is shown in Figure 5 and described further in the sections that follow.
• Select documents to serve as source for models
• Convert documents into extractable formats
• Select relevant sections within the documents
• Specify
o The fields to be extracted from sections
o Which fields are text to be parsed as English sentences
o Input / output directories and other run parameters
• Run extraction software, which
o Reads in specifications and source files
o Builds Perl data structures corresponding to document indenture
o Reads Aerospace Ontology and knowledge base files
o Calls parser (Reconciler or Charmak) on English text
o Tags relationships
• Tag subject / verb / object
• Tag part-of and connection relationships
• Annotates the Perl structure with these tags
o Translates Perl structure to xml; writes xml structure report
o Logs difficulties, unparsable text, unknown words, etc
Pass xml stricture report to HIT software
Figure 5: Procedure for model information extraction.
Document-structure specification grammar and extraction software
FMEA documents and Requirements documents are the main sources of model information. These
documents have been generated from a database. For contractual and programmatic reasons, there
is not timely, direct access to the database, or even its table structure. There is timely access to the
documents. These documents are in proprietary Microsoft Word or Adobe pdf (Acrobat) formats.
Several public-domain text extraction modules were tried, but proved to be error-prone. The "save as
text" capabilities of Word and Acrobat have worked the best.
Each document has a readily apparent regular structure of numbered indentured document sections.
Within a single section, there is additional regular structure. For example, within a FMEA Appendix:
• Each FMEA worksheet has an item-name, author, item-part-number, and a numbered set of
Failure Modes.
• Each Failure Mode has a worksheet number, date, and a numbered set of Causes.
• Each Cause has a name, phase, and description.
A grammar is used to specify document structure. The grammar, coded in Perl, is used to break apart
the document and organize its parts into structured text. A full listing of the grammar is not in the
scope of this report, but Figure 6 shows a sample fragment of a specification, with comments.
Specifications are written out in detail for families of documents such as FMEAs, hazard analyses, or
interface requirements.
The substructure varies slightly from one FMEA or Requirement document to the next. Subfields and
numbers of columns in tables change across documents. The same information can appear once on a
single line, or may be broken across several lines. The specification for an individual document
references the family specification, and adds (or overwrites) specification details particular to it.
When a document is analyzed, the extraction software builds a hierarchical Perl structure that
corresponds to the extracted document structure. For this project, structured text has been extracted
from five Requirement documents and three FMEA documents. Extraction is accomplished by using
the grammar and associated software modules. Using the same grammar and software, an analyst on
a related project has extracted requirements and parent-child relationships from over 50 Orion
software requirements documents.
# First line is 'Appendix M1' and a title.
FMEA Worksheets
_> (recognizer => qr/^(appendix \s+
nameFromRec => [gw(name title)],
subsections => [gw(FMEA)], # Has
hasText	 => 01,
FMEA	 # Capture name from first line
_> {recognizer => qr/^FMEA Number:
nameFromRec => [gw(name)],
allowedAttributes => 1,
M\d*) \s*\-+ \s* (.+\D)\s*$/xi,
individual worksheets within it
of a single FMEA worksheet
subsections => [gw(FailureMode ItemFunction)],
itemizer	 => qr/^ ([:]+): \s+ (\S (:? .*\S)?) \s* $/x,
# Look for pairs of fields on a single line.
sharedFields => ('Prepared by Reliability Engr' _> [1Da.t4_,1]
'Concurred by Design Engr' 	 _> ['Date'],
'FMEA Revision'
	
_> ['Date'],
'Drawing Number'	 _> ['Ref Des`]))
Figure 6. Excerpt from an FMEA worksheet structure specification.
Sentence parsing and tagging
Some substructures contain sentences that describe the hierarchical parts structure of the vehicle
components or the connections between components. These are selected for parsing and tagging.
STAT separates sentence clauses and pulls out syntactical relationships (subject, verb, object,
indirect-object) from the clauses. Consulting the Aerospace Ontology, STAT adds tags to the
syntactical structure:
• Verbs that indicate connecting relationships — sends, supplies, transfers
• Verbs that indicate part-of or other structural relationships — contains, consists of, comprises
Tags are added as annotations to the Perl structure. This structure is passed in xml format to the HIT
software, for semi-automatic model development.
The following long sentence from a FMEA document introduction illustrates the richness of this text. It
has been used to provide a challenge test to our extractions.
The LAS consists of a nose cone, a canard section which enables the LAS to reorient the CM for
parachute deployment following an abort, three propulsive motors (attitude control, jettison, and
abort), a bi-conic adapter which provides the structural interface to the CM, and a boost protective
cover (BPC) sized for ascent heating to protect CM thermal protection system (TPS) coatings.
The sentence describes connectivity, three levels of parts hierarchy, and two acronyms. The goal is to
extract the following information:
Toplevel: LAS
Component: Nose cone;
Component: Canard section,
Function: reorient the CM,
Rationale: parachute deployment following an abort;
Component: Three propulsive motors
Component: attitude control motor,
Component: jettison motor,
Component: abort motor
Component: A bi-conic adapter,
Function: provide the structural interface to the CM,
Connection: (biconic adapter to CM, type structural)
Component: Boost protective cover
Acronym: Boost protective cover = BPC
Rationale: sized for ascent heating
Function: protect CM thermal protection system coatings
Acronym: thermal protection system = TIPS
Currently, most of this information can be extracted, but there are some errors on the parts hierarchy
implied in the sentence. Some of this parts information is also available the in FMEA worksheets.
Improved parsing and tagging
Experience with Orion documents has led to numerous additional extraction improvements.
Abbreviations. Text often mixes abbreviations with spelled-out forms. STAT starts with extensive
lists of aerospace and NASA abbreviations. STAT also reads abbreviation tables from individual
documents, and it can recognize and learn abbreviations when encountering them in text — e.g., in
"These are candidates for Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR.)"
The model generation software uses the acronym information to transform all variations into one
standardized identifier. For example, an "abort motor through bulkhead initiator" could be referred to
as "AM through bulkhead initiator," "LAS abort motor TBI," or "AM TBI." Any multi-word name that has
an officially recognized acronym is replaced by that acronym before a new component or connection
is created. "Launch Abort System Abort Motor Through Bulkhead Initiator" would be replaced by "LAS
AM TBI." The acronym "LAS" is removed because the AM TBI is a part of the LAS. The standardized
identifiers help eliminate duplication in the model. The list of existing model components is examined
to determine if a component named "AM TBI" already exists or should be created.
Tests and requirements. Terms denoting problems often turn up as adjectives in the names of tests
or other engineering activities or artifacts. For example, "corrosion testing" should not be tagged as an
occurrence of a corrosion problem. STAT recognizes such phrases and tags them properly as
engineering activities or artifacts.
Inflected forms. Any of several related words such as "acquire," "acquiring," or "acquirable" can
denote a concept such as "aquire." Typically, these inflections have been aggregated by wildcard
stemming — acquir*. This is often too broad or too narrow. The wildcard acqui* tags both acquisition
(correct) and acquittal (wrong), but acquir* tags neither. STAT solves this problem by using in-depth
morphological analysis and a knowledge base of irregularly inflected forms.
Some inflected forms shouldn't be tagged. For example, "blocked" and "blockages" denote
obstructions but "block" commonly denotes a section of text in a regulation. By default, STAT tags all
inflections with a concept from the ontology. This tagging can be adjusted for individual inflections,
and differently for different domains.
Parsinq and styling. Problems are often denoted by some desirable concept term that is negated or
modified, for example, "not aligned," "arrived too late," or "difficult to complete." Standard keyword
tagging fails to distinguish between these occurrences and corresponding positive concept terms
("aligned," "arrived," "complete"). The modifying words are called styles. To assign tags, STAT
recognizes and combines the positive terms and the styles. STAT has seven groups of style types:
negation, excess, insufficient, bad, difficult, early, and late. The ontology provides up to several dozen
modifying terms (words or phrases) for each group.
Combining positive terms and styles is straightforward when styles are adjacent to concepts, for
example, "incorrectly aligned." However, styles and concepts can be separated by intervening text, for
example, "Neither pin was aligned correctly." To correctly tag text, STAT performs a full-natural
language parse to determine if concept terms are within the linguistic scope of style words.
Complex Sentences and Scopincl. When long sentences contained several clauses, the original
simple parser usually correctly extracted no more than the first subject/verb/object triple. Integration of
a new parser into STAT has substantially increased the number of correctly parsed sentences. 10 The
new statistical parser performs a complete syntactical analysis. It also prunes extraneous information
before parsing and identifies the semantic roles of verb complements.
Semi-Automated Model Development and System Visualizations
HIT software has been developed to generate component-connection models from the tagged
sentence data structures extracted by STAT. A capability has also been added to automatically lay
out visualizations of the models.
HIT Component Extraction Methodology
For each extracted sentence in a document (FMEA or IIRD), HIT searches the Aerospace Ontology
to determine if there are ontology concepts that match the sentence parts of speech and that indicate
that a component connection is being described. The rules for identifying sentences representing
component connections are as follows:
• The subject of the sentence must map to a concept in the Aerospace Ontology that is a kind of
component or artifact.
• There must be an indirect object that maps to a concept in the Aerospace Ontology that is a kind
of component or artifact.
The direct object of the sentence must be an entity that maps to an Aerospace Ontology concept
for something provided by one component to another (e.g., power or information).
The sentence verb must map to a concept that denotes the act of transmission (e.g., "send" or
"receive").
An "indirect object" may be identified by prepositional phrases, where the preposition denotes that the
object of the phrase is the source or destination of the entity that is identified as the sentence's object
(e.g., "from" or "to").
Figure 7 shows an example of one such sentence and the generated data structure that satisfies the
rules for a component connection. The concept-class names following the word "MATCHES" indicates
the concept that satisfies one of the rules for a component connection.
"^ w C-41.5ha d yec--04 heafth and stafus data from the L eVi-n accordance with :2L?-L4S- f_"Iv_ 0027"
((<< . -L ;R "D'0 11 :NI.''.T,'HE" (W_'r'OIdCEFT- 1:'LASS "At it_System>))
(:: s :S 'T..F R' "CM ` :MA TCHES (#<CONCEF'T- L--,SS "Aeruspace_System">))
,^.T_ "DATr''." :MATCHES (#<CONCE.FT- 1_'L1!LSS "Infortnation or `_ignal_Obj">))
(; _a-receive" -.MATCHES (#:CONCEPT-CLASS "Receive">))) - -
Figure 7: Sentence extracted from the CEV IIRD and the data structure supporting the existence of a
connection from the LAS to the CM.
High-Level model extraction from Internal Interface Requirements Documents
The IIRDs provide general information on connections between the LAS, CM, and SM. The top-level
CEV model generated from the IIRD for the LAS, CM, and SM is shown in Figure 8. Each connection
from the CM to the LAS represents several IIRD requirements. One connection represents power
transmission from the CM to the LAS. The second connection represents various types of commands
to be transmitted from the CM to the LAS. Despite the inclusion of the SM in the IIRD title, there is no
further SM connection information. The fact that the model extraction process shows a lack of
connections to the SM from the other two modules could be potentially useful information to analysts
evaluating the completeness and correctness of the IIRD.
Documentation and source information in visualizations
The existence of a given model element (i.e., a component or a connection between components)
may be supported by more than one sentence in more than one document. As part of model
generation, all sentences that justify the creation of a model element are identified. These sentences
and the titles of the source documents from which they were extracted are attached to the model data
structures. This information can be displayed by a mouse click in the graphical display, over the arrow
representing a connection or the icon representing a component.
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Figure 8: Top-level model generated from an IIRD document.
Figure 9 shows the Documentation display for one of the two connections from the LAS to the CM that
are shown in Figure 8. Note that the second IF.CM .LAS requirement is the sentence matched to a
component connection in Figure 7. The "type of thing sent" entry is the concept in the Aerospace
Ontology that matches the sentence object and that satisfied the rule that a sentence must reference
some entity that could be transmitted from one component to another. In this case, the entity
"command" matches the Information_or_Signal_Obj concept in the Ontology.
Detailed Component Connection Models Extracted from FMEAs
In Figure 8, the label "INNER MODEL" inside the CEV module icons indicates that each module can
be decomposed into a lower level of components and connections. The HIT model generator extracts
these lower-level connections from the text of the CEV FMEA document, which provides more
detailed information about component connections.
DOCUMENT TITLE:
Internal Interface Requirements
Document (IRD)
Launch Abort System (LAS) to Crew
Module/Ser ice Module (CMPSM) IRD
IF.CM.LAS.0052
Type of thing sent: Information_or_Signal_Obj
Source text: The LAS shall provide health and status data to the CM in
accordance with TBD-LASCM-
0037.
IF.CM.LAS.0053
Type of thing sent: Information_or_Signal_Obj
Source text. The CM :shall receive health and status data from the LAS in
accordance with TBL: ,-LASCM-
0037.
IF.CM.LA.S.0056
Figure 9: Documentation display for a LAS-CM connection extracted from an IIRD.
A portion of the FMEA worksheet text for the abort motor through bulkhead initiators (TBIs) is shown
in Figure 10. The Indenturements section at the top of FMEA worksheet describes the part
relationships. The HIT model generator uses this information to assign components to the correct
CEV inner model. The FMEA also states the quantity of components of the type covered by the FMEA
item. The FMEA Item Function description often describes connections to other components. This
connectivity information is used to create the connections between model components. Figure 11
shows the component connection data structure that is generated from the FMEA in Figure 10.
Program: Constellatinn
Project: Orion
Element: r rely- E;.:pl_-ration ':+ehicle ( EV)
Module: Launch Abort System
System: Launch Ab in System (LAS)
Sub - System: Ordnance
Item Name: LAS, Abort Motor TBI
Item Part Number: F'ENL:,INO-2'103
Drawing Number:	 Ref Des:
Qty:`
LC:N:
Item Function: jThe Abut Motor Through Bulkhead Initiator: provide initiation energy to the abort
motor- igniter during an abort.
Figure 10: FMEA stating that the LAS contains two TBIs connected to abort motor igniters.
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ID	 "FMEA-M41_175"
SEIITEHCE	 "The ,abort Nlot rr Through Bulkhead Initiators provide initiation energy to the
abort rrot_or igniter dl-Irinq an abntt."
SOIDEP	 (:VIVORD "INITIATOR"-
T-N-V , .TCHES (#=OVVL::CONC:EPT-CLASS "Igniter">)
:QUALIFIERS f"ANV "THROLI :3H" "BULKHEAD")
:COA1F'CI'JEPJT-Dr',T, (:QTY 2 :ITEII-1-PJ,_",1v1E "Arv1 TBI"
:SUPER-P.A.RT #gLAS (_'C: 1 N-1PONEI'JT-10 103>))
PECEIVEP	 (--':I':ORC: "IC:NITEF
:CAT-MATCHES (#ccOVVL::CONCEPT-CLASS "Igniter">)
:QUALIFIERS ("ANT') :COMPONENT-DATA
(JTEN144.1'kME "Ar41 IGNITER"
:SUPER-FART #-=LAS COr,1P(_-?I,JENT-10003>))
uBJECT-SEIIT (:VV RD "ENERG'Y"
T-N-L ,T:'HES (#ccOVVL::CONCEPT-CLASS "Energy_or_Power">b
:QUALIFIERS ("INITIATION"))
C0IIIIECT-VERB (WOR .1 "PR _ %.:IC,E"
.C.A,T-M,A,TCHES (#<OVVL::CONC:EPT-=LASS "Provide' 5)
:DIRECTION :FROM-SLIBJ)
Figure 11: A component connection data structure derived from the FMEA for TBIs in Fig. 10.
Information provided by model visualizations
Figure 12 shows the inner model of the LAS pyrotechnics that was automatically created from several
FMEA worksheets. Unlike the connections in the top-level CEV model, many of the connections from
the FMEAs represent direct physical connections between components. Even the model connections
that do not represent direct physical connections indicate some form of dependency.
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Figure 12: Inner model of the LAS extracted from FMEA document.
The component at the head of each connection arrow depends on the functions of the component at
the tail. For example, the model shows components labeled "FCDC" ("flexible contained detonator
cord") connected directly to the ACM and AM. The FCDCs are actually physically connected to the
TBIs, which are the components in direct contact with the motor bulkheads in the pyrotechnic system.
However, the successful operation of both motors depends on the proper operation of the FCDC cord
system. The FCDC system is analogous to "wiring" or "network."
In Figure 12, the structurally identical networks of components connected to the AM and ACM in the
LAS model reflect the identical connectivity for the two motors in the schematic of the pyrotechnic
system in Figure 4. Although not all of the connections to the motors in the model represent physical
connections in the system schematic, the visualization indicates that the FMEA worksheets account
for dependencies among components associated with the two motors.
Comparison of the LAS model with the schematic also shows that there are components in the
FMEAs that do not appear in the schematic (e.g., Jettison Motor NASA Standard Initiators labeled "JM
NSI"). Likewise, there are components in the schematic not mentioned in the FMEAs. For example,
the parts labeled "NSD" in the schematic are not in the FMEAs. They are apparently detonators
activated by the pyrotechnic event controllers labeled "PEC." The visualization makes these
discrepancies in the FMEA document much easier for an analyst to find.
References to a component or connection found in a document during model generation are added to
the information display for that component or connection. Examination of these collected references
reveals that, for some components, there are multiple FMEAs describing different failures modes
rather than a single FMEA describing all component failure modes. For example, one FMEA for the
abort motor described a "fires prematurely" failure mode and a second described a "fails to fire" mode.
Both of these failures could have been included in a single FMEA item. The visualization makes such
anomalies in the information easier for SMA analysts to find.
Sorting our multiple components and connections
When an FMEA states a quantity of like components greater than 1, HIT creates the same number of
components with the same name but different numerical suffixes, as shown in Figure 12. When a
sentence indicates a connection with sets of components, a modeling problem arises. For example,
"The Abort Motor Through Bulkhead Initiators provide initiation energy to the abort motor igniter ..."
Because there are equal quantities of TBIs and igniters in this case, HIT makes pair-wise connections
between TBIs and igniters having the same suffix. In other words, AM TBI-1 is connected to AM
Igniter-1 and AM TBI-2 is connected to AM Igniter-2. If the quantities of two sets of connected
components differ, cross-strapping is assumed (i.e., each component in one set is connected to every
component in the other set).
Aerospace Ontology
The screening rules for model development use Aerospace Ontology classes. The Aerospace
Ontology has been enhanced to support these rules for identifying sentences representing component
connections and screening out spurious mappings to model structures. To support the screening rule
for transmitted things, distinctions between the concepts of Electrical Power and Mechanical Power
have been sharpened. Senders can be distinguished from Receivers in the architecture by using the
action verb categories Output and Take-In. This determines whether the indirect object or the subject
is the Receiver or Sender.
A modeling rule requires components to be descendants of either the Artifact_ or_ Device category or
the Physical
—
Structure category. The Aerospace Ontology was enhanced to include more domain
concepts and mapping words (including acronyms) that are used to describe launches and
12
components of rockets, pyrotechnic components, and launch abort systems. Terms were also added
to describe LAS hazards and problem detection, including types of test and inspection and corrosion
factors.
A Channel type and several subtypes were added to the ontology, to support identification of types of
carriers of entities moving along connections. This set of new types is shown in Figure 13. Each
category name is followed by a list of mapping words and phrases that indicate that category if they
are found in the text. These channel types often denote a supporting structure such as a network of
wires or pipes. Thus, they can be used to recognize components that may not be enumerated in full in
a FMEA because they serve as connection network infrastructure.
Channel (passive transport): channel, pipe, conduit, tube, duct, pathway, course, passage
1. Signal_ Carrier: bus, data bus, data channel, network, broadband, fiber optic cable, local area
network, LAN, intranet, internet, extranet, world wide web, WWW, communication loop...
2. Wireless_Signal_Carrier: radio wave, radio frequency, S-band, Ka-band, Ku-band, L-band, X-
band, AM, FM, radio frequency, RF, ultrasonic, short-wave, wireless, WIFI, Wi fi...
3. Electrical—or —  Power_ Carrier: optical fiber, wire, bus wire, stub wire, ground wire, line, lead,
wiring, conduit, tube, raceway, wireway, busway, wiring duct, circuit, circuitry, cable...
4. Pyro_Carrier: detonating cord, flexible confined detonating cord, FCDC, shielded mild
detonating cord, SMDC, fuse, ignition cord, igniter cord
5. Fluid _Carrier: line, fluid line, loop, fluid loop, pipe, pipette, duct, tube, capillary tube, tubing,
hose flex hose, siphon, syphon, wick, culvert, fluid jumper, conduit
6. Domain_ Fluid_ Carrier: pipeline, water line, hydraulic line, coolant line, gas line, steam line,
propellant line, water loop, hydraulic loop, gas loop, steam loop, high pressure line...
Figure 13: Types of channel in the Aerospace Ontology.
An interface can be a connection, carrier, or channel, but it may also be a component that performs
an interface type of function. A hierarchy of Interface structure types and subtypes was created, as
shown in Figure 14. This information can be used in future model generation to distinguish types of
interface components and structures.
1. Information_ Interface: information connection, information interface
1.1. Message: message, communication, command, confirmation, indication, notice,
notification, e-mail, email
1.1.1. Comment: comment, annotation, callout, remark
1.1.2. Problem_Message: alarm, caution, warning, error indicator, error flag, error
message, complaint, hazard indicator
1.2. Human_ Interface: user interface, UI, human interface, display
1.3. Software_ Interface: software interface, avionics interface, software driver, driver, API
1.3.1. Command
—
or
—
Data
—
Interface: data interface, command interface, remote interface
unit, RIU, data port, access point, USB, FireWire, Ethernet, ATA/IDE, SCSI, PCI ...
2. Physical_ Interface_Component: physical interface, adapter, umbilical, umbilical cable
2.1. Connection: connection, connector, coupler, coupling, cross coupling, chain, strap, cinch,
socket, dynatube fitting, key, flange connector
2.1.1. Fastener: fastener, anchor, bolt, eyebolt, screw, self-tapping screw, nut, Iocknut,
safety nut, lug, lug nut, nail, washer, pin, crimp pin, linchpin, rivet, blind rivet ...
2.1.1.1.
	
Separation_ Fastener: separation bolt, separation nut, disconnect, quick
disconnect, release mechanism, quick release, pyrobolt, explosive bolt ...
2.1.2. Distributor: distributor, multiplexer, splitter, manifold, 3-way junction, T junction, Y
junction, demultiplexer
2.2. Mechanical
—
Interface; mechanical interface, mechanical connection
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2.2.1. Mechanical
—
Closer: isolator, safe and arm device
	
2.2.1.1.	 Plug: plug, cork, stopper, bung
	
2.2.1.2.	 Valve: valve, poppet valve, poppet, relief valve, safety valve, glove
valve, gate valve, check valve, piston valve, ball valve, needle valve ...
2.2.2. Mechanical_ Outlet: vent, orifice, nozzle, faucet, hose bib, drain
2.3. Electrical—or —  Power_ Interface: power interface, power connection, electrical interface,
electrical connection
2.3.1. Electrical—or —  Power_ Connector: plug, fuse, pin, contact, terminal contact,
connector, connector plug, interconnect
2.3.2. Electrical_ Closer: switch, switchgear, DIP switch
2.3.3. Electrical_ Outlet: socket, terminator
2.4. Structural
—
Interface: structural interface, structural connection
2.4.1. Spacer: stand off, standoff, separator, spacer, edge spacer, shim spacer, spacer
block
2.4.2. Structural_Opening: airlock, door, window, porthole, viewport, hatch
2.5. Biological_Interface: biological interface, biological connection
Figure 14: Types of interfaces in the Aerospace Ontology.
Simulation Scripts
CONFIG scripting capabilities were enhanced to support a script for a launch abort scenario after
second-stage ignition. The script emulates some of the software operations controlling a sequence of
rocket firings and stage separations. A new DELAY option was added to script specifications so that
conditional events can be caused to occur after a time delay rather than immediately at the time the
condition is present.
A function detection model and a logging specification support detecting whether specific system-wide
functions are present during a CONFIG simulation. The presence or absence of a system-wide
function may be dependent on the states of multiple system components. The function modeling utility
was expanded to include the capability to specify the time when a particular function has succeeded.
This was determined to be useful due to the nearly instantaneous nature of some critical functions in
Constellation, such as the separation of rocket stages.
This work on simulation scripts is exploratory, leading up to enhancing HIT and CONFIG for an LAS
hazard analysis case.
Virtual System Integration Laboratory Simulation Model
An interconnected system structural framework simulation model of the LAS has been developed for
the VSIL. This comprises the functional blocks that are involved in the LAS decision logic and
execution of a launch abort sequence. VSIL parts include CEV and LAS avionics, pyrotechnic
separators for LAS and CM, avionics connections to the pyrotechnics, AM, ACM, JM, thrusters for
AM, ACM and JM, valve assembly and control system, igniter assemblies, canard, fairing, spacecraft
adapter, ground systems, mission systems, and Constellation Communication Adaptor network node.
Papers and Publications
Jane T. Malin, David R. Throop, Land Fleming and Carroll Thronesbery, Information Extraction for
System-Software Safety Analysis, 26th International System Safety Conference, Vancouver, Canada,
August 2008.
This paper describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures
and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the
following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine
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the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform
graph analysis on the models to identify possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and
functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations; 4) perform discrete-time-based
simulation on the models to investigate scenarios where these paths may play a role in failures and
mishaps; and 5) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. This paper
describes new challenges in a NASA abort system case, and enhancements made to develop the
integrated tool set.
Calendar Year 2009 — 2010 Plan and Milestones
April 2009	 Extract LAS Pyrotechnic System Hazard Reports and FMEA failure modes information.
May 2009	 Complete Orion LAS model extraction case and evaluation of visualization.
July 2009	 Complete Orion LAS hazard path analysis, with test case definition.
Aug 2009	 Complete analysis evaluations.
Aug 2009	 Complete preliminary methods document.
Sep 2009	 Complete first version of enhanced and integrated tool suite.
Sep 2009	 Software Assurance Symposium Presentation.
Oct 2009	 Submit conference paper on integrated tool suite.
Nov 2009	 Submit new technology disclosure on integrated tool suite.
Dec 2009	 Complete annual report.
Jan 2010	 Manage and compare model versions when source documents change.
Feb 2010	 Complete model extraction for new Orion case, including model versions and changes.
Mar 2010	 Complete new Orion hazard analysis case, comparing changes due to updates.
Jun 2010	 Complete enhanced version of integrated tool suite.
July 2010	 Complete evaluations and final methods document.
Aug 2010	 Complete project analysis results files or reports.
Sep 2010	 Software Assurance Symposium Presentation.
Sep 2010	 Complete project Final Report.
Sep 2010	 Complete project software source files and documentation and deliver on CDs.
January — September 2009 Technical Plans
Work in 2009 will continue to focus on enhancements to STAT, HIT, and the Aerospace Ontology for
Orion and LAS model extraction and development. The SMA project participant has requested that
extractions be made from LAS Pyrotechnic System Hazard reports and compared to FMEA
extractions, to "close the loop" between FMEAs and hazard analyses. This work will be added to
model extraction tasks. Path analysis is dependent on extraction of functions and failures from FMEA
documents. Extraction of these types of information is in progress.
Progress has been made on generating architecture models from text that implies component
connections, and parsing capabilities are being substantially enhanced. This progress will enable
extraction improvements in the following areas:
Extractin_g and Structuring Information on Component Failures and Functions. Parsing
progress will enable extraction of additional information on component functions and failures,
for use in hazard path analysis. Failure mode descriptions in the FMEAs can describe input
failures and internal functional failures of components. These can describe inputs that disable
functions and additional component functions that may fail. This is the type of failure and
vulnerability information needed for hazard path analysis.
• Eliminating Spurious Components and Connections. As can be seen in Figure 12, the
model extraction methods developed to date do not guarantee that all the components and
connections created are valid. For example, the connections of a "JM Safe&Arm" and an
"AM/ACM Safe&Arm" to a common "FCDC" is not correct. FCDC cords are themselves
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connectors used throughout the pyrotechnic system, and the two Safe&Arm devices are not
connected to the same FCDC segments. Also, the components labeled "ACM FCDC-1," "AM
FCDC-1," etc. are actually the connectors referred to by the sentence concerning Safe&Arm
devices. One objective of future work is to address such problems. The new Carrier concepts
in the Aerospace Ontology (Figure 13) can be used to help identify the FCDC connectors.
• Extractin_g Connections from More Complex Sentences. Some sentences refer to
connections generally while using singular forms. They actually describe multiple connections
between more than two components. One FMEA example is the sentence:
"The 3-port manifold distributes energy from the Safe&Arm to the AM FCDC and ACM
FCDC for abort."
This sentence describes the actual physical connections for a manifold, one of the Safe&Arm
components, and the FCDCs of the two motors. There are actually two sets of components,
each consisting of a manifold, a Safe&Arm, and three segments of FCDC. Improvements to
STAT parsing should make sentences such as this useable for component-connection
extraction.
HIT path analysis CONFIG simulation software will be enhanced to use the extracted LAS models to
identify hazardous configurations, scenarios, and test cases. New HIT capabilities are also planned to
support multiple model versions. This will support reuse and analysis to evaluate requirements and
design changes. A first version of the integrated tool suite will be completed, and a preliminary
methods document for its use will be written. The project has not begun extracting operational and
failure scenarios. FMEA effects information is a potential source for parts of failure scenarios.
The scope and performance of the tools for extraction, model development, and analysis will be
evaluated: 1) the mix of automated and manual tasks and the manual time and effort required; and 2)
the relevance and usefulness of the outputs to SMA personnel and to VSIL. Software performance will
be evaluated: 1) comparison of the amount of model information extracted automatically with the
amount that could be extracted manually; 2) comparison of the hazards and failures identified by
graph analysis with those found with standard hazard analysis; and 3) comparison of ease of current
test generation methods with test generation by graph analysis and simulation.
During 2009, Triakis will continue developing the VSIL by coding the behavior of simulator system
elements to match the requirements given. This will be done to the extent necessary to facilitate
testing of hazards identified by the research team. Triakis will also explore the viability of using the
outputs from STAT or HIT, to automatically generate tests that may be used to verify identified
hazards in the VSIL.
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